In 2009, Wang et al. proposed an efficient and secure dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme based on the one-way secure hash function. This letter demonstrates that Wang et al.'s scheme is still vulnerable to impersonation attacks.
Introduction
A remote user authentication scheme [1] is used to verify the legitimacy of remote users' login requests through an insecure channel. Password-based authentication scheme is the most common method to check the validity of the login message and authenticate the user. Recently, many authentication schemes [1] - [12] have been proposed to improve the security and practicability of authentication.
Quite recently, Wang et al. [12] proposed an efficient and secure dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme based on the one-way secure hash function. Wang et al. claimed that their scheme has the following merits: 1) it allows users to change and choose passwords freely; 2) server does not maintain any verifier tables because it uses a smartcard to store a secret key; 3) it provides mutual authentication between user and remote server; 4) it overcomes the fatal drawback that user's authentication is independent of the password; 5) it is secure to against ID-theft [9]- [11] , replay attacks and insider attacks, etc.
Unfortunately, we find that Wang et al.'s scheme [12] is still vulnerable to impersonation attacks. Accordingly, this letter demonstrates that Wang et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to impersonation attacks, in which an attacker can easily impersonate any legal user.
Review of Wang et al.'s Scheme
We briefly recall Wang et al.'s scheme in [12] . The notations used in the scheme are shown as follows:
• U: The user Wang et al.'s scheme is composed of four phases; the registration phase, the login phase, the verification phase and the password change phase.
Registration Phase
The user U i sends the registration request to the remote server S :
where x is the secret key of the remote server, and pw i is the password of U i chosen by S . 3. S personalizes the smartcard with the parameters [h(·), N i , y], where y is the remote server's secret number stored in each registered user's smartcard. 4. S ⇒ U i : pw i and smartcard.
Login Phase
When a user wants to login to the remote server, he/she inserts the smartcard into the terminal and keys the identity ID i and the password pw i , then the smartcard will perform the following steps:
where T is the current date and time.
Verification Phase
When the remote server S receives the login request hold, S accepts the login request of U i , otherwise, the login request will be refused.
Compute
3. Compute
and verifies whether it is equal to ID i in the login request. If it does not holds, S rejects the login request of U i , otherwise, accepts it. Then, S computes
using the results of Step 2.
Upon receiving the reply message (a , T ) at time T * , U i verifies as:
and compares it with the received a . If it holds, U i confirms that S is valid. 
Password Change Phase
When user wants to change the password, he/she inserts smartcard into the terminal device, keys the password pw i and requests to change the password to new one pw new , then the smartcard computes
and replaces the N i with new N * i , password gets changed.
Security Analysis of Wang et al.'s Scheme

User Impersonation Attack by an Attacker E
Suppose an attacker E wants to impersonate a legal user U k (k i). To succeed in the impersonation attack, E first obtains the identity ID k of U k . E can easily obtain all legal users' identities from the login phase because these values are transmitted on open network. When U i sends a login request message (ID i , CID i , N i , T ) to S in Step 2 of the login phase, E intercepts it and then replaces ID i with ID k . Finally, E sends a forged login request message
Upon receiving the forged login request message (ID k , CID i , N i , T ), S will perform the following:
1. S will check the validity of the time interval. Since T − T ΔT always holds, S will accept the forged login request of E.
S then will compute
4. S finally will verify whether ID k is equal to ID k in the login request. Since it always holds (see the Eqs. (3) and (4)), S will accept the forged login request of E and believe that the request party is a user U k (not U i ).
Consequently, E can freely impersonate any legal user without being detected by the server S by using the above impersonation attack.
The proposed user impersonation attack by an attacker E can succeed only during the valid time period T − T ΔT . However, the success probability of the proposed attack is very high. That is, an attacker E can simply replace ID i with ID k within valid time period ΔT of S because it does not require any computation time. As a result, Wang et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to the above user impersonation attack by an attacker E.
User Impersonation Attack by a Legal User U i
Moreover, a legal user U i also can easily impersonate other legal users U k (k i) by using an identity ID k (k i) of the target user. For example, U i first finds a value δ in advance which satisfies the following equation:
Then, U i computes the followings:
Finally, U i sends a forged login request message
Then, S will believe that the request party is a user
The proposed user impersonation attack by a legal user U i can succeed only during the valid time period T − T ΔT . However, the success probability of the proposed attack is very high. That is, the illegal user U i can simply modify CID i and N i with CID * k and N * k within valid time period ΔT of S because it needs to compute two XOR operations. As a result, Wang et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to the above user impersonation attack by a legal user U i .
Conclusion
User authentication scheme technology has been widely deployed in various kinds of applications. Quite recently, Wang et al. proposed an efficient and secure dynamic IDbased remote user authentication scheme based on the oneway secure hash function. However, this letter demonstrated that Wang et al.'s scheme is still vulnerable to impersonation attacks. For this reason, Wang et al.'s scheme is insecure for practical application.
